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NOTES.
ARREST-LIABILITY FOR ARREST IN ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE-

In a per curiam opinion on a rule to show cause of action and discharge on common bail the Court of Common Pleas No. 2, of Philadelphia County, recently decided that bail was demandable in an
action for negligence.' The case illustrates the difficulty in getting a
court to do something different from what has been done before in
a question of practice. An auto when the brakes were suddenly
applied, skidded on a street slippery from a slight snow and struck
another. There was no doubt that the accident happened purely
'Adams v. Rogasner, December Term, 1g16, Philadelphia, C. P.' No. 2,
No. 4250.
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from negligence, though it was debatable which party was really to
blame.
The ancient writ of capias ad respondendum was not an original writ, but issued only to arrest a defendant, after a summons had
been issued and returned nihil or served and the defendant had
defaulted in appearance. This writ was at first issuable only.in
actions for injuries accompanied by force, but was extended by
statute to actions of account, 2 actions of debt and detinue,3 and all
actions on the case 4 though no breach of the peace had occurred.
Prior to the last-nafied statute it was customary in all tort cases to
take out a writ of trespass quare clausum fregit, vi et artnis, in order
to get the capias, and then to proceed for any other less forcible injury with-the consent of the court.
Then gradually it became the custom to take out the capias in
the first instance, and if objection was made to draw up a fictitious
original writ and return.
As the capias was not the original writ, but only issued after
the prior writ had been disobeyed or returned nihil, the defendant
was arrested in all cases, no matter how trivial the offence. As the
original writ became fictitious this seemed a harsh rule, so by various
statutes it was provided that unless the plaintiff made oath that his
damages were a certain amount, at first iol. or more, and included a
statement of the cause of action in the writ, the capias could only
be served as a summons and the defendant would only have to give
common bail. But it was only possible in actions of debt, or trover,
or case for money due, to swear to a certain amount of damage.
Hence in actions of trespass, bail could not be had of course, but
would be allowed by the judges in cases of special and violent injuries, as mayhem or atrocious battery, or where the defendant for
some reason had to be kept within the jurisdiction of the court.
In Pennsylania the practice was to arrest on a capias for almost everything. In 1725 the assembly passed an act exempting any
freeholder with a certain amount or value of land from arrest on a
capias.
An affidavit of cause of action was not required as a prerequisite to obtaining the writ. But contrary to the practice in England
where no writ could issue marked for bail without a previous order
of the court, it was customary to mark the writ for bail in a certain
sum in all cases in which it might fairly be presumed that the.court
would require bail. Then the defendant might rule the plaintiff to
show cause of action. At the hearing on this rule the court would
2 Statute of Malberge, 52 Hen. HII,c. 23; Statute of Westrn.
C. It.

'25
' i9

Ed. II,'t z7.
Hen. VII, c. 9.

"III Blk. 281, 287, 29z.
'Act Mardh 20, z725, I Sm.

164.

2,

r3 Ed. I,
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determine whether bail should have been allowed and how much. In
actions for uncertain damages as trespass, slander, etc., there was
common bail only, except by special order of the court. The writ
would then be marked "no bail required," and served as a summons.
with authority
The defendant would in such cases endorse the writ
7
to the prothonotary to enter an appearance for him.

It is significant that Roberts in his Digest makes no mention of
actions on the case, i. e., those based on negligence or on the actions
of the defendant's servant. It is also significant that the judges of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in i8oS, in -reporting what
English statutes were in force in the state did not mention that one
which extended capiasto actions on the case.6
In 1836 the assembly passed a comprehensive statute covering
of actions by summons and capias ad respondenthe commencement
dum.9 Section 3 of this act provided that it should be the duty of
the prothonotary of any court having jurisdiction on the application
of the plaintiff in any personal action, instead of a writ of stimmons,
to issue a writ of capiasad respondendum in a certain form. This
apparently broad power to issue a capias was limited to a large extent by the two subsequent sections of the act.
Section 4 provides, "That no writ of capias ad respondendurn
shall issue in any case, unless the plaintiff, his agent or attorney,
shall previously thereto make affidavit, setting forth:
"First: The cause of action, and the amount in which the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff, or the value of the property taken
or detained, or the damages sustained, as the case may be, to the
best of the deponent's knowledge or belief; and,
"Second: That to the best of the deponent's knowledge or
belief, the defendant is not an inhabitant of this commonwealth, or
if such inhabitant that he has no known residence therein to the
knowledge of the deponent, or that he is about to 4uit the commonwealth, without leaving sufficient real or personal estate therein to
satisfy the demand; which affidavit shall be filed of record in the
suit."
Section 5 provides, "That it shall be lawful for a plaintiff in
any action founded upon actual force, or which shall be brought by
reason of actual fraud or deceit, upon affidavit of the facts, to have
a capias as aforesaid, against any person not otherwise liable to
arrest."
All statutes inconsistent with this act or "supplied" by it were
thereby repealed: Within this category fell the Act of 1725, exempting freeholders.*
After this statute no one could be arrested on a capias, unless
'Roberts' Digest, 88, 89; Carroll v. Simmons, 2"C. C.

'See note 4, supra.
'Act June 13, 1836, P. L. s7.
I See note 6, suPra.

29

(Pa.

19o).
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he was not an inhabitant of the state, or had no known residence
herein, or was about to leave without leaving sufficient property to
satisfy the demand, or unless action was founded on actual force
or actual fraud or deceit. In either-case the plaintiff must file an
affidavit of the facts necessary to give the right to the capias, and
in case the defendant was a non-resident or about to quit the jurisdiction, must state the amount of damages sustained to the best of
his knowledge and belief.
Capias in an action based on negligence could under this statute
be issued only if the defendant was a non-resident or about to leave
the state without leaving property. But in such cases capias couldalways be issued.-1 So by this act no added right was given to issue
capias in actions for negligence.
Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1836 were repealed two years
later by an act,1 2 whose eleven -different sections deal with eight
different subjects, ranging from the inspection of butter and lard to
the boundaries of the borough of Allegheny, and all previous laws repealed or supplied by them were revived. This act revived the Act
of 1725,13 exempting freeholders, and abolished the necessity of an

affidavit of cause of action as a prerequisite for obtaining the writ
of capias,though the latter is now required by rule of court in many
counties.
This left in force that section of the Act of 1836, which provided for the issuance of capias in any personal action. It is by
force of it that capiashas been issued and bail allowed in actions for
negligence. But it hardly seems possible that the legislature intended
to create this entirely new liability. The legislature of 1836 clearly did
not intend to pass the third section without the qualifications of the
fourth and fifth. It does not seem reasonable that the legislature in
1838 so intended, if it can be supposed that they had any idea what
they were doing considering the heterogeneous character of
the act. It is much more probable that they only intended to get
rid. of the liability of a freeholder for arrest in actions based on
force or fraud, and the requirement of filing an affidavit before obtaining a writ. These were the only new features of the Act of 1836.
Aside from them it was merely a statement of the common law.
There is no case reported of an arrest in an action for negligence before the act. Judge Tilghman stated in Duffield v. Smith,14
that bail was not demandable in trespass because there was no measure of damages, except when the defendant was about to leave the
state, or in cases of violent battery, or where large damages had
already been given in another action arising from similar circumstances. If then we are to regard the statute as expressing the
Duffield v. Smith, 6 Binney 3o2 (Pa.
Act April 14, 1838, P. L. 457.

See note 6, supra.
"See pote zz, suPra.

1814).
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common law, unless the contrary is clearly shown, we must come to
the conclusion that the right to arrest on a capias in an action for
negligence was not given by the Acts of 1836 and 1838.
If an action for negligence is included within the "any personal action" of the Act of. 1836, it would seem that an action for
an injury done by one's partner, or servant, or wife, would be also
included. But the courts have uniformly held that such was not the
case. 31

This view is also supported by dicta in several Pennsylvania

cases.

Judge Tilghman's dictum in Duffield v. Smith 26 has been

is cited with approval by Judge Arnold in
mentioned above. This
17

Carroll v. Simmons, who after a review of the history of capias
in Pennsylvania adds, *'Imprisonment for debt on contract being
now abolished, except in actions on promises to marry, and females
being exempted altogether from arrest in civil cases, it would- be
well if the capias ad respondendum were abolished in all cases."

In Gelsavage v. Mardos,"8 an action for assault and battery,

Judge Newcomb said, in discussing a motion to discharge on common bail, "The test of such a motion is not whether enough appears

to warrant substantial damages, but whether they are so specific in
character as to be capable of an estimate at the present stage and on

the face of the complaint."
In Orzel v. Cominsky,19 Judge Broomall said, "It is true that
there is a general rule that in actions of trespass bail is not demandable, because there is no standard by which the damages can be
measured. . . . In matters of mere tort, bail is not of course, but

may be directed by the special order of the court." The same judge
on the same day refused to allow bail in a suit for injuries "caused
by the negligence of the defendant in not guarding a cellar way in
a sidewalk."20
But in spite of these considerations the courts of Pennsylvania
generally hold that the defendant may be arrested on a capias in an

action for negligence."

In New Jersey the rule is that in no tort action for unliquiated damages may the defendant be arrested, unless some special
ground is shown therefor." Cases in some states seem to say that
(Partner) Bassett v. Davis, x Clarke P. L J. 310 (Pa. i812); (servant)
Carroll v. Simmons, 11 D. R. 47, 27 C. C. 29 (Pa. 1902); (wife) Reader v.
Rosendale, 21 W. N. C. x53 (Pa. 1887); O'Connor v. Walsh, 29 W. N. C. 92
(Pa. z8gx).
See .note ii,supra.
"See note 1s, supra.
U22 D. R. 844 (Pa. 1913).
"30 York io4, I4Del. Co. 173 (Pa. 1916).
"Turner v. Sugarman, 14 Del. Co. 175 (Pa. 1916).
'Dungan v. Read, 167 Pa. 393 (z895); Adams v. Rogasner, see note 1,
supra: contra, Turner v. Sugarman, see note 2o, supra.

. " Bennett v. Benson,

25

N. J. L 166 (i8s)-
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arrest is permissible in any tort action. But none of these cases are
actions for negligence.2a
In New York arrest is allowed in an action for the negligence of
the defendant himself,2 4 but not for that of his servanL2
that there may be no arrest
A Quebec case expressly decides
6
in an action based on negligence.2
In practically every jurisdiction this question is regulated by

statute.

E.N.V.

'Jones v. Kelley, 17 Mass. 116 (i82!);-Barnes v. Tenney, 52 Vt. 57
(r88o); In re Kindling, 39 Wis. 35 (1875); Mullin v. Frost, i8 N. B. 463
(1879).
"Ritterman v.,Ropes, 52 N. Y. Super. (1885); People ex rel. Harris v.
Gill, 85 App. Div. 192 (N. Y. i9o3).
0 Lasche v. Dearing, 23 N. Y. Misc. 722. (1898); Davids v. R. RL, 45 N.
Y. Misc. 2o8 (1904).
"Chartrand v. Smart, 23 Quebec Super. 3a4 (igoz).

